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Abstract—We present CRYPTFLOW, a first of its kind system
that converts TensorFlow inference code into Secure Multi-party
Computation (MPC) protocols at the push of a button. To do
this, we build three components. Our first component, Athos, is
an end-to-end compiler from TensorFlow to a variety of semi-
honest MPC protocols. The second component, Porthos, is an
improved semi-honest 3-party protocol that provides significant
speedups for TensorFlow like applications. Finally, to provide
malicious secure MPC protocols, our third component, Aramis,
is a novel technique that uses hardware with integrity guarantees
to convert any semi-honest MPC protocol into an MPC protocol
that provides malicious security. The security of the protocols
output by Aramis relies on hardware for integrity and MPC for
confidentiality. Moreover, our system, through the use of a new
float-to-fixed compiler, matches the inference accuracy over the
plaintext floating-point counterparts of these networks.
We experimentally demonstrate the power of our system
by showing the secure inference of real-world neural networks
such as RESNET50, DENSENET121, and SQUEEZENET over
the ImageNet dataset with running times of about 30 seconds
for semi-honest security and under two minutes for malicious
security. Prior work in the area of secure inference (SecureML,
MiniONN, HyCC, ABY3, CHET, EzPC, Gazelle, and SecureNN)
has been limited to semi-honest security of toy networks with
3–4 layers over tiny datasets such as MNIST or CIFAR which
have 10 classes. In contrast, our largest network has 200 layers,
65 million parameters and over 1000 ImageNet classes. Even on
MNIST/CIFAR, CRYPTFLOW outperforms prior work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multiparty computation (or MPC) allows a set
of mutually distrusting parties to compute a publicly known
function on their secret inputs without revealing their inputs to
each other. This is done through execution of a cryptographic
protocol which guarantees that the protocol participants learn
only the function output on their secret inputs and nothing else.
MPC has made rapid strides - from being a theoretical concept
three decades ago [62], [26], to now being on the threshold
of having real world impact. One of the most compelling use
cases for MPC is that of machine learning (ML) - e.g. being
able to execute inference over ML algorithms securely when
the model and the query are required to be hidden from the
participants in the protocol. There has been a flurry of recent
works aimed at running inference securely with MPC such
as SecureML [45], MinioNN [42], HyCC [15], ABY3 [44],
CHET [20], EzPC [17], SecureNN [61], Gazelle [38], and
so on. Unfortunately, these techniques are not easy-to-use by
ML developers and have only been demonstrated on toy deep
neural networks (DNNs) on tiny datasets such as MNIST or
CIFAR10. However, in order for MPC to be truly ubiquitous
for secure inference tasks, it must be both effortless to use and
capable of handling large ImageNet [23] scale DNNs.
In this work, we present CRYPTFLOW, a first of its kind
system, that converts TensorFlow [3] inference code into
secure computation protocols at the push of a button. By
converting code in TensorFlow, a ubiquitous ML framework
that is used in production by various technology companies,
to secure computation protocols, we significantly lower the
entry barrier for ML practitioners and programmers to use
cryptographic MPC protocols in real world applications. We
make the following four contributions:
First, we provide a compiler, called Athos, from Ten-
sorFlow to a variety of secure computation protocols
(both 2 and 3 party). In the absence of Athos, all prior
works require manually re-implementing ML models in
an MPC friendly low-level language/library, and hence,
their evaluations have been limited to toy benchmarks
where this task is feasible.
Second, we provide a semi-honest secure 3-party compu-
tation protocol, Porthos, that outperforms all prior proto-
cols for secure inference and enables us to execute, for
the first time, the inference of ImageNet scale networks,
that too in about 30 seconds.
Third, assuming a minimally secure hardware which
guarantees the integrity of computations, we show a
novel technique, Aramis, that compiles any semi-honest
secure MPC protocol to a malicious secure MPC pro-
tocol. Aramis only requires these integrity checks and
no confidentiality guarantees for data residing within
the hardware. The overhead of malicious security of
Aramis based protocols is much lower compared to prior
approaches, which enables the first implementations of
DNN inference secure against malicious adversaries. Prior
MPC protocols are either much slower than Aramis or fail
to provide security against malicious adversaries.
Fourth, we demonstrate the ease-of-use, efficiency and
scalability of CRYPTFLOW by evaluating on
(a) RESNET50 [30], which won the ImageNet Large
Scale Visual Recognition Challenge in 2015 [23];
(b) DENSENET121 [33], a convolutional neural network
that won the best paper at CVPR 2017; and
(c) SQUEEZENET [35] with Fire modules.
All these networks have heavily influenced the ML com-
munity with thousands of citations each. To demonstrate
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that CRYPTFLOW is immediately useful in healthcare, we
also evaluate CRYPTFLOW on DNNs used for prediction
of lung diseases and diabetic retinopathy.
Our toolchain and all of our benchmarks are publicly
available1.We now describe our results in more detail.
A. Results
CRYPTFLOW outperforms prior work on ease-of-use, scal-
ability, and efficiency. It automatically compiles TensorFlow
code to MPC protocols with no loss in classification accuracy.
This makes CRYPTFLOW the first secure inference system
to produce a Top 1 accuracy of 76.45% and Top 5 accuracy
of 93.23% for predictions running securely on the ImageNet
dataset. Furthermore, in the 3-party setting, this can be done
in about 30 seconds with semi-honest security and about 2
minutes with malicious security. Prior work in the area of se-
cure inference ([45], [42], [15], [44], [20], [17], [38], [61]) has
been limited to toy networks with 3–4 layers over tiny datasets
such as MNIST or CIFAR which have 10 classes. Moreover,
these implementations are limited to security against weaker
semi-honest adversaries, that are assumed not to modify the
code of the MPC protocol. In contrast, our largest network has
200 layers, 65 million parameters, over 1000 classes, and the
user can choose between semi-honest and malicious security –
the latter also protects against adversaries who can modify the
code of the MPC protocol arbitrarily. Even on MNIST/CIFAR,
CRYPTFLOW has lower communication complexity and is
more efficient than prior and concurrent works [61], [44], [10].
Furthermore, CRYPTFLOW is the first system to implement2
malicious security for secure DNN inference. We show that
the overhead of Aramis over semi-honest protocols is small
and varies between 25% and 3X depending on the size of
the computation. Moreover, by very conservative estimates,
Aramis based secure DNN inference is faster than state-of-the-
art malicious secure MPC protocols [39] by at least an order
of magnitude. Hence, on inference tasks, prior MPC protocols
are either much slower than Aramis or fail to provide security
against malicious adversaries. A summary of all our evaluation
can be found in Section I-C.
B. Components of CRYPTFLOW
We describe the three components of CRYPTFLOW next.
Athos (Section III). Athos is a compiler that compiles
TensorFlow inference code to secure computation protocols.
There are several challenges in doing so. First, for performance
reasons all efficient secure computation protocols perform
computation over fixed-point arithmetic - i.e., arithmetic over
integers or arithmetic with fixed precision. This is in contrast
to TensorFlow where computations are over floating-point
values. Athos automatically converts TensorFlow code over
floating-point values into code that computes the same
function over fixed-point values. This compilation is done
while matching the inference accuracy of floating-point code.
1https://github.com/mpc-msri/EzPC
2ABY3 [44] provided a theoretical protocol to convert their semi-honest
protocol into a malicious secure protocol on much smaller benchmarks
than CRYPTFLOW, but did not provide an implementation or experimental
validation.
All prior works ([45], [42], [38], [44], [61]) in the area of
running ML securely have performed this task by hand with
great losses in accuracy. For example, it is trivial [2] to obtain
a floating-point DNN with over 99% accuracy on classifying
handwritten digits as 0, 1, · · · , 9. However, SecureML [45]
works with a hand constructed fixed-point DNN which has
only 94% accuracy to classify digits as 0 or 1. Although these
fixed-point conversions are feasible to do manually for one
or two toy benchmarks, this task quickly becomes intractable
for large benchmarks and needs to be repeated for every
new benchmark. Athos works by “sweeping through” various
precision levels to estimate the best precision. The output of
Athos is a sequence of function calls where each function
can be implemented by an appropriate secure computation
protocol, e.g., ABY [22] in the case of 2-party computation,
Porthos for semi-honest secure 3-party computation and
Aramis for malicious secure 3-party computation. This design
of Athos addresses the challenge of modularity and makes it
easy to incorporate new MPC protocols (Section III-C) and
compiler optimizations (Section III-D).
Porthos (Section IV). Porthos is an improved semi-
honest 3-party secure computation protocol (tolerating one
corruption) that builds upon SecureNN [61]. Porthos makes
two crucial modifications to SecureNN. First, SecureNN
reduces convolutions to matrix multiplications and invokes the
Beaver triples [11] based matrix multiplication protocol. When
performing a convolution with filter size f × f on a matrix of
size m×m, the communication is roughly 2q2f2 + 2f2 + q2
elements in the ring Z264 , where q = m − f + 1. Porthos
computes these Beaver triples by appropriately reshaping
m×m and f × f matrices. This reduces the communication
to roughly 2m2 + 2f2 + q2 ring elements. Typically the filter
size, f , is between 1 and 11 and the communication of Porthos
can be up to two orders of magnitudes lower than SecureNN.
Additionally, in SecureNN, the protocols for non-linear layers
(such as Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) and MaxPool) require
the third party to send secret shares to the first two parties.
In Porthos, we cut this communication to half by eliminating
the communication of one of these shares. This reduces the
communication in the overall ReLU and MaxPool protocols
by 25%. Thus, by reducing the communication in both linear
convolution layers and non-linear layers, the communication
in Porthos is several GBs lower than SecureNN (Table IX).
Aramis (Section V). Semi-honest secure MPC protocols
assume that the protocol participants follow the protocol
specification honestly and compute every message of the
protocol correctly with respect to their input and the
protocol history. On the other hand, maliciously secure MPC
protocols make no such assumptions on the adversary and
are guaranteed to be secure even when protocol participants
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. Obtaining maliciously
secure MPC protocols through cryptography can often be
challenging and expensive – typically some sort of “proof
of honest computation” must be provided by the parties
for every step of the protocol. We show a novel technique
that uses hardware with integrity protection and compiles
MPC protocols secure against semi-honest adversaries into
MPC protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries.
Our system, Aramis, only assumes a hardware with a) the
integrity guarantee that once the code is attested, it cannot
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be modified; and b) the ability to securely sign messages
(without the host machine or party running the hardware
being able to forge signatures). We formalize this secure
hardware as an ideal functionality and show how it can
be realized with Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (Intel
SGX) [37]. This trust assumption on the secure hardware is
significantly weaker than prior works on secure computation
based on SGX [56], [52], [29], [9], [18] which assume that
SGX completely hides all secrets from the host and even if
data is decrypted and computed upon inside SGX, it cannot be
viewed by the host. In contrast, in our adversarial model, the
host can see all the data inside the hardware. Since we rely
on semi-honest MPC for confidentiality, unlike prior works
that use SGX, Aramis is naturally resistant to all side-channel
attacks. To demonstrate the generality of Aramis, we compile
both the semi-honest GMW (2 party protocol) [26] and
Porthos (3 party protocol) to obtain malicious versions of
these protocols. Porthos compiled with Aramis gives the first
experimentally vetted maliciously secure protocol for neural
network inference. Running interactive MPC protocols that
perform memory intensive inference tasks in SGX with low
overhead requires us to address various challenges that are
discussed in Section V-D.
C. Summary of empirical results
We list the claims empirically validated by this work:
CRYPTFLOW is the first work to automatically run
MPC protocols for ImageNet scale DNNs (Table IV)
and realistic DNNs used in healthcare (Section VI-F).
CRYPTFLOW compiles TensorFlow code to MPC pro-
tocols whose runtime and communication scale linearly
with the depth of DNNs (Figure 10).
MPC protocols for fixed-point are much more efficient
than their floating-point counterparts (Table I). There-
fore, CRYPTFLOW uses fixed-point arithmetic. Athos-
generated fixed-point code matches classification accu-
racy of floating-point code (Table VII).
The 2-party computation (2PC) protocols (ABY, CHET,
MiniONN, EzPC, Gazelle) are much slower than the
3-party computation (3PC) protocols (Table VIII and
Table VI). Thus, in CRYPTFLOW we focus on running
the large benchmarks with Porthos, a 3PC protocol.
Porthos has lower runtime and communication than prior
3PC works on secure inference (SecureNN [61] and
ABY3 [44]) (Table IX and Table V).
Aramis is a general technique that can be used to port
MPC protocols like GMW to SGX with minimal over-
head (Table X). Aramis-based protocols for inference
secure against malicous adversaries have about 3X over-
head over the corresponding semi-honest secure protocols
(Table IV). For inference tasks, Aramis is much more
efficient than pure crypto-based approaches to malicious
security (Section VI-E1).
D. Organization of the paper
We provide an end-to-end walkthrough of our system to
illustrate the overall toolchain in Section II. In Section III, we
describe Athos, our float-to-fixed conversion method. Section
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Fig. 1: CRYPTFLOW: End-to-end toolchain
IV describes our improved 3-party semi-honest secure protocol
for neural networks. We describe Aramis that compiles any
semi-honest secure protocol into a malicious secure protocol,
in Section V. We present all our experimental results in Section
VI, related works in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we describe the end-to-end working of
CRYPTFLOW through an example of logistic regression. The
high level toolchain is shown in Figure 1. We describe,
at a very high level, how code compilation happens from
TensorFlow to secure computation protocols.
The CRYPTFLOW toolchain takes as input code written in
vanilla TensorFlow. For example, consider the code snippet
for logistic regression over MNIST dataset in TensorFlow
as shown in Figure 2. Our compiler compiles this code to
MPC protocols using the following sequence of steps. It first
generates the TensorFlow graph dump (as shown in Figure
3a) as well as metadata to help compute the dimensions of
all the tensors (Figure 3b). III-A provides more details on the
frontend. Once this is done, the TensorFlow graph dump is
compiled into a high-level intermediate language HLIL. The
code snippet for logistic regression in HLIL is shown in Figure
4a. Next, Athos’ float-to-fixed converter translates the floating-
point HLIL code to fixed-point code in a low-level intermediate
language LLIL. This step requires Athos to compute the right
precision to be used for maximum accuracy (Section III-B).
Figure 4b shows the LLIL code snippet for logistic regression.
The function calls in this sequence can be implemented with
a variety of secure computation backends - e.g. ABY [22] for
the case of 2-party secure computation, Porthos for the case
of semi-honest 3-party secure computation (Section IV) and
Aramis (Section V) for the malicious secure variant. Different
backends provide different security guarantees and hence vary
in their performance. For this example, the three backends take
414ms, 6.5ms, and 10.2ms respectively.
III. ATHOS
Athos compiles ML inference code written in TensorFlow
to MPC protocols. It has the following main components:
Frontend. Athos frontend compiles TensorFlow code to
a high-level intermediate language (HLIL). HLIL sup-
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# x is an MNIST image of shape (1,784).
# W and b are the model parameters.
print(tf.argmax(tf.matmul(x, W) + b, 1))
Fig. 2: Logistic Regression: TensorFlow snippet
x W
MatMul
MatAdd
b
ArgMax
Output
(a)
Node Outgoing
dimensions
x 1× 784
W 784× 10
MatMul 1× 10
b 1× 10
MatAdd 1× 10
ArgMax 1× 1
(b)
Fig. 3: Logistic Regression: (a) TensorFlow graph definition
(b) Metadata consisting of graph nodes and their outgoing
dimensions
ports floating-point tensors and sequence of function calls
(corresponding to the TensorFlow nodes) that manipulate
tensors. The main challenge in the frontend is to reconcile
dynamic typing in TensorFlow to static typing in HLIL.
TensorFlow code, written in Python, does not have tensor
dimensions, whereas our HLIL has explicit tensor dimen-
sions as it enables the compiler to perform optimizations.
Float-to-fixed converter. While ML models use floating-
point arithmetic, MPC protocols operate on fixed-point
arithmetic. Rather than requiring the programmers to
manually convert (or re-train) their models to integers,
Athos performs the conversion automatically, without
compromising on the inference accuracy.
Modular LLIL. Athos compiles floating-point HLIL code
to fixed-point code in a low-level intermediate language
(LLIL). LLIL is a C-like imperative language that sup-
ports integer tensors, loops, conditionals, and functions.
LLIL also makes it easier for different cryptographic
backends to be plugged into Athos. It precisely specifies
the interface that it requires the cryptographic protocols to
xW = MatMul(x, W);
xWb = MatAdd(xW, b);
output(ArgMax(xWb));
(a)
// Assume Athos chooses
// 15 bit precision
xW = MatMul(x, W);
ScaleDown(xW, 15);
xWb = MatAdd(xW, b);
output(ArgMax(xWb));
(b)
Fig. 4: Logistic Regression in (a) floating-point: HLIL syntax
(b) fixed-point: LLIL syntax
implement, while providing a library for other operations.
The LLIL is compiled down to the MPC protocol code.
Optimizations. Athos implements MPC specific optimiza-
tions as well as several standard dataflow analyses and
compiler optimizations. The design of HLIL and LLIL,
and the choice of them being statically typed, is partly
motivated by the requirements of these analyses.
Below we explain each of these components in detail.
A. Frontend and HLIL
Athos frontend compiles the input TensorFlow models to
HLIL (described next) with explicit tensor dimensions. To
obtain these dimensions, the frontend first runs TensorFlow
code on one dummy input and generates TensorFlow metadata
that has all the required information. The metadata is then
translated to HLIL.
We discuss some details of the frontend. A plain dump
of the TensorFlow metadata contains some nodes that are
semantically irrelevant for actual inference, e.g. identity,
assign, etc. To avoid representing these nodes in HLIL,
we first prune the TensorFlow graph to remove such nodes,
specifically we use the TensorFlow graph transform tool [1] for
this purpose. Next, we carefully review each of the remaining
(tens of) TensorFlow nodes and desugar them to HLIL, while
keeping the number of functions in HLIL as small as possible.
TensorFlow also supports “broadcasting” [58] that allows op-
erations on tensors of incompatible dimensions and sizes. For
example, due to broadcasting, addition of a four dimensional
tensor with a one dimensional tensor is a valid operation. Athos
frontend passes the broadcasting information to HLIL, which
then accounts for it by compiling it to the appropriate LLIL
library function call.
Constant n ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | . . .
Float constant r ::= n.n
Type τˆ ::= float | int | τˆ [n]
Matrix Mˆ ::= r | Mˆ
Expression eˆ ::= n | x | Mˆ | eˆ1 ⊕ eˆ2 | x[eˆ]
Program pˆ ::= void main () {τˆ x ; f(eˆ)}
Fig. 5: HLIL syntax
Figure 5 shows the HLIL (we use r to denote sequences
of floating-point constants, and similarly for other syntactic
categories). It is a simple language of floating-point tensors
(Mˆ ), with dimensions (n) and sizes as explicit type annotations
(τˆ [n]), and the main is a sequence of variable declarations and
function calls.
We next discuss how Athos performs float-to-fixed conver-
sion on HLIL programs.
B. Float-to-fixed
As observed earlier, most ML models are expressed using
floating-point, while MPC protocols operate on integers. For
large models, we cannot expect the programmers to manually
translate or re-train floating-point ML models to integer code
(the common approach in literature on secure inference of toy
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models [45], [42], [38], [44], [61]). Furthermore, it is well-
known that floating-point operations are much more inefficient
than fixed-point when evaluated securely ([45], [44]) – we
re-confirm this by performing two-party secure multiplica-
tion [21] using both fixed-point and floating-point arithmetic
to showcase the difference. This is illustrated in Table I
which shows the huge overheads associated with floating-point
arithmetic. In future, if efficient protocols for floating-point
become available then we can directly compile HLIL to them,
but until then Athos automatically performs the translation.
The translation is parametrized by a scale parameter s that
determines the precision. We discuss how this scale is set later
in the section. Given a scale s, we define a map ρs : R→ Z2b
that maps Reals to b-bit integers: ρs(r) = br · 2sc. We abuse
notation and also apply ρs to matrices M of Reals where
the result is a point-wise application of ρs to each matrix
element. In the output fixed-point code, every Real number
r is represented by a b-bit integer. The Real representation
of an integer n is given by n2s . The float-to-fixed conversion
(for interesting cases) is described in the following algorithm
(ScaleDown is described in Table II):
F (n) = n
F (r) = ρs(r)
F (Mˆ) = ρs(Mˆ)
F (float x) = int x
F (MatAdd(A,B,C)) = MatAdd(A,B,C)
F (MatMul(A,B,C)) = MatMul(A,B,C);
ScaleDown(C, s)
As an example of the conversion process, consider the
program M1 ∗ M2 that multiplies the row vector M1 =
[400.1, 200.1] with the column vector M2 = [0.3, 0.1]T . Then
in infinite precision Real arithmetic the result of the computa-
tion 400.1∗0.3+200.1∗0.1 is 140.04. Floating-point arithmetic
only has a 23-bit mantissa and computes the approximately
correct result 140.040009. When using Athos, the computed
result can be much more precise than the floating-point result.
We use 0.1f to denote the floating-point number closest to the
Real number 0.1. Given s = 24, F (M1 ∗M2) results into the
following program over integers
(ρ24(400.1f) ∗ ρ24(0.3f) + ρ24(200.1f) ∗ ρ24(0.1f))/224
which results in the following computation with 64-bit integers
(6712564224 ∗ 3357121024 + 5033165 ∗ 1677721)/224
The final result is 2349481329 that represents the real number
2349481329
224 = 140.040000021457672119140625 which is a
better approximation than the floating-point result.
Athos, assigns the same bit-width b and the same scale
s to all network parameters. While we could use different b
and s, our experimental results show that same values for all
parameters works quite well in-practice. We keep the scale
public for efficiency: division with 2s when s is secret is much
more expensive than when s is public. Moreover, scaling down
operations (division by 2s) cause loss of precision, as they lose
significant bits, and hence need to be minimized. Therefore,
Athos scales down only once per matrix multiplication and
does not scale down matrix additions.
# Sequential Multiplications Fixed (ms) Float (ms) Overhead
1 2.57 72.35 28.11x
10 4.88 278.8 57.1x
100 21.65 2735 126.34x
1000 199.6 25281.42 126.6x
TABLE I: Floating-point vs Fixed-point multiplication.
While we use machine integer width (64) for b, finding a
good value of s is difficult. We explain the various tradeoffs
that govern the choice of s and then discuss our solution.
Suppose, in our example, s is set too low: s = 2. Then
F ([400.1f, 200.1f ] ∗ [0.3f, 0.1f ]) is
(1600 ∗ 1 + 800 ∗ 0)/4
which represents the Real number 400/4 = 100. This result
is far from 140.04. Here, low scale values have lead to loss
of significant bits. In particular, 0.1 has been rounded to zero
causing an imprecise result. Ideally we want to set the scale to
a large value so that the integers have many significant digits.
Next, suppose s is set to a very high value, e.g., 60.
Then, the computation ρ60(400.1f) ∗ ρ60(0.3f) overflows 64-
bit integers and the result is garbage (multiplication of these
two large positive numbers would become a negative number).
Thus, scale can neither be very low nor very high; we
need to find a sweet spot. To determine an appropriate value
of s, we sweep over all its possible values {0, 1, . . . , b − 1}
and choose the value that leads to the best accuracy. For the
example 400.1f ∗0.3f+200.1f ∗0.1f , the most accurate result
is obtained at s = 24. In general, machine learning algorithms
have a validation dataset which is used for hyperparameter
tuning. We consider scale as a hyperparameter and select the
scale that leads to a fixed-point classifier implementation which
performs the best on the validation set. This scheme helps us
select values of scales that result in minimal accuracy loss.
C. Modular LLIL
Constant n ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | . . .
Type τ ::= int | τ [n]
Matrix M ::= n |M
Expression e ::= n | x |M | e1 ⊕ e2 | x[e]
Statement s ::= τ x | x = e | for(x = e1;x < e2;x++){s}
| x[e1] = e2 | if(e, s1, s2} | s1; s2 | return e
| f (e) | d (e)
Global g ::= extern τ d (τ x) | τ f (τ x){s}
Program p ::= g; void main () {s}
Fig. 6: LLIL syntax
Athos compiles HLIL to LLIL, a crypto-aware, C-like
intermediate language that has only integer-valued tensors.
Figure 6 shows the syntax of LLIL.
This language is a subset of C and has sufficient expressive-
ness required to implement ML inference tasks. In particular it
supports arrays, basic arithmetic, loops, branching, functions,
and extern declarations. LLIL makes the Athos interface to
the MPC cryptographic protocols explicit. We observe that
the tensor operations in a typical TensorFlow code fall into
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two categories: those that do not change the values but just
copy the data around (e.g. squeeze to remove dimensions of
size 1 from a tensor, pad to pad a tensor with various kinds
of paddings, transpose to take the transpose of a tensor,
and concat to concatenate two tensors into a single tensor),
and those that compute new values. For functions that do not
manipulate shares (denoted by f ), LLIL provides a library with
their implementations that is automatically added as a prelude
to LLIL programs. Changing the underlying crypto protocol
does not require changes to these library functions and this
library can be used by all crypto developers. These functions
are implemented in LLIL and are compiled to C++ code.
Share-manipulating functions (extern d) are required to
be implemented in the cryptographic backend. All a crypto
developer needs to do is to implement these functions, and
then she would be able to directly evaluate the protocols on
ML models used in practice. We describe these functions with
their signatures and intended semantics in Table II. Concretely,
we provide three implementations of these functions: using the
2PC protocols of ABY [22], 3PC protocols of SecureNN [61],
and Porthos (Section IV).
Finally, Athos compiles LLIL programs to C and links
them with the cryptographic MPC protocol implementation.
D. Optimizations
Athos intermediate languages are designed to be amenable
to static analysis. In particular, we have implemented several
standard dataflow analyses and compiler optimizations [6]:
reaching definitions, liveness analysis, and so on. These anal-
yses help with optimizing memory utilization and we have
observed savings reaching upto 80%. To demonstrate the ease
of implementing analyses and optimizations, we provide an
example each: (a) a peephole optimization ReLU MaxPool
Switching on HLIL to improve efficiency of DNNs that use
ReLU and MaxPool, and (b) an analysis Counting Scale Down
operations on LLIL to determine the number of scale down
operations done in order to prevent loss in accuracy (a similar
analysis was done manually in [45], [61], [44]).
1) ReLU MaxPool Switching: The ReLU operation is
one of the most time intensive task in secure inference of
DNNs. For some DNNs, secure evaluation of ReLUs can
consume upto 80% of the total protocol execution time.
This is in contrast to evaluation in the clear where ReLUs
consume only a fraction of the total time. Hence, it is
plausible that ML developers can write TensorFlow code in
a way that has no impact on cleartext evaluation but can
severely degrade the performance of secure evaluation. One
such idiom involves applying ReLU to a matrix followed by
MaxPool. Notice that ReLU and MaxPool are commutative
operators: ReLU(MaxPool(·)) is functionally equivalent to
MaxPool(ReLU(·)). Moreover, for cleartext performance, there
is no discernible difference in the performance of these two
alternatives. Hence, most TensorFlow developers have adopted
the convention of MaxPool(ReLU(·)).
For secure evaluation, MaxPool(ReLU(·)) can be much
more inefficient than ReLU(MaxPool(·)) as this significantly
reduces the number of ReLU operations that need to be
performed in MPC. Hence, we have built an optimization pass
on HLIL that replaces occurrences of MaxPool(a, b, ReLU(A));
with ReLU(MaxPool(a, b, A));. For example, if the input ma-
trix A has dimensions 112 × 112 × 64 and we compute
a MaxPool with 2 × 2 windows. Then, the output matrix
has dimensions 56 × 56 × 64. Hence, the latter needs to
compute only one fourth the number of ReLUs compared to
the former. In this case, the optimized code is over 3× better in
communication and over 2× faster in our experimental setup
(Section VI).
2) Counting Scale Down operations: We describe an anal-
ysis to count the number of scale down operations in an LLIL
code. The analysis uses an environment ρ that maps tensors
to the number of elements they contain. This environment
is populated using variable declarations in the code. The
analysis makes a single pass over main and for each call
ScaleDown(A, s) accumulates ρ(A) into a counter. The final
value of the counter provides the number of scale down
operations in the code.
Note that this analysis is easy to describe as the LLIL code
contains dimensions of all the tensors explicitly. Hence, the
compiler can statically populate ρ. This analysis is impossible
to perform on the TensorFlow Python code as the sizes of
tensors are unknown at compile time.
IV. PORTHOS
We now describe Porthos, our improved secure 3PC pro-
tocol that provides semi-honest security against one corrupted
party and privacy against one malicious corruption. The notion
of privacy against malicious corruption (introduced by Araki
et al. [8]) informally guarantees that privacy of inputs hold
even against malicious party as long as none of the parties
participating in the protocol learn the output of the computation
(this is relevant for example, when computation is offloaded to
servers). Porthos builds upon SecureNN [61] but makes crucial
modifications to reduce communication. We first describe our
protocols that reduce communication and summarize concrete
improvements in Table III.
We reduce communication for both linear as well as non-
linear layers of DNNs. Linear layers include fully connected
layers as well as convolutional layers. We improve the
communication for convolutional layers and our optimization
gains get better with larger filter sizes. With regards to
non-linear layers (ReLU and MaxPool), we modify how two
of the protocols in SecureNN are used – ComputeMSB and
ShareConvert. As we explain below, this directly translates
to better communication for both ReLU and MaxPool
computations. At a very high level, we trade communication
with compute by modifying the way certain shares are
generated in the protocol.
Convolution. In SecureNN, secure computation of
convolutional layers is done by reducing them to a (larger)
matrix multiplication. As an example, 2-dimensional
convolution of a 3 × 3 input matrix X (with single input
channel and stride 1) with a filter Y of size 2× 2 reduces to
a matrix multiplication as follows:
Conv2d
([
x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6
x7 x8 x9
]
,
[
y1 y2
y3 y4
])
=
[
x1 x2 x4 x5
x2 x3 x5 x6
x4 x5 x7 x8
x5 x6 x8 x9
]
×
[
y1
y2
y3
y4
]
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MatMul(int[L][M] A, int[M][N] B, int[L][N] C) Multiply two tensors A and B and store results in C
MatAdd(int[L][M] A, int[L][M] B, int[L][M] C) Add two tensors A and B into C
Conv(int[H][W][CI] A, int[FH][FW][CI][CO] F) Convolve a tensor A with filter F
Avg/Max Pool(a, b, int[H][W][C] A) Apply a stencil that computes the average/max value in windows of size a× b of tensor A.
ArgMax(int[M] A) Compute the index with maximum value in A
FusedBatchNorm(int[K][L][M][N] A, int[N] B, int[N] C) Returns ∀k, l,m, n.B[n]× A[k][l][m][n] + C[n]
ReLU(int[M][N] A) Returns ∀i, j.Max(A[i][j], 0)
ScaleDown(int[M][N] A, k) Divide each entry of A with 2k .
TABLE II: Share manipulating functions. These have been simplified for exposition by suppressing parameters such as padding
and strides. For comprehensive signatures, see https://www.tensorflow.org/api docs/python/tf/.
In the above matrix multiplication, we call the left matrix
(derived from X) as the “reshaped input” (say, X ′) and the
right matrix (derived from Y ) as the “reshaped filter” (say, Y ′).
The matrix multiplication is computed securely using a matrix
Beaver triple [11], [45] based protocol. Later, the output can
be reshaped to get the output of convolution in correct shape.
In this protocol, matrices being multiplied are masked by
random matrices of same size and communicated and hence,
the communication grows with the size of the matrices. We
observe that this is quite wasteful for convolution because the
reshaped input image (the first matrix in multiplication) has
many duplicated entries (e.g., x2 in row 1 and row 2) that get
masked by independent random values. Let size of X be m×m
and size of Y be f×f . Then, the size of X ′ is q2×f2, where
q = m − f + 1. In Porthos, we optimize the size of matrix
based Beaver triples for convolution by exploiting the structure
of re-use of elements as the filter moves across the image. At
a high level, we pick random matrix of size matching X for
masking and communication only grows with size of X (i.e.,
m2) instead of X ′ (i.e., q2f2) in SecureNN.
Before, we describe our optimized protocol, we set up some
notation. Let 〈x〉t0 and 〈x〉t1 denote the two shares of a 2-out-
of-2 additive secret sharing of x over Zt – in more detail, pick
r
$←− Zt, set 〈x〉t0 = r and 〈x〉t1 = x− r (mod t). 〈x〉t denotes
a sharing of x over Zt. Reconstruction of a value x from its
shares x0 and x1 is simply x0 + x1 over Zt. This generalizes
to larger dimensions - e.g. for the m×n matrix X , 〈X〉t0 and〈X〉t1 denote the matrices that are created by secret sharing the
elements of X component-wise (other matrix notation such as
Reconstt(X0, X1) are similarly defined).
Let Conv2dm,f denote a convolutional layer with input
m ×m, 1 input channel, a filter of size f × f , and 1 output
channel. Our protocol for Conv2dm,f is described in Algo-
rithm 1, where L = 2`, ` = 64. Algorithms ReshapeInput,
ReshapeFilter and ReshapeOutput are used to reshape input,
filter and output as described above and are formally described
in Appendix A. Parties P0 and P1 start with shares of input ma-
trix X and filter Y over ZL That is, Pj holds (〈X〉Lj , 〈Y 〉Lj ) for
j ∈ {0, 1}. In SecureNN, P0 first reshapes 〈X〉L0 into 〈X ′〉L0 by
running ReshapeInput. Then, it picks a random matrix 〈A′〉L0
of same size as X ′ and sends 〈E′〉L0 = 〈X ′〉L0 − 〈A′〉L0 to P1
that requires communicating q2f2 elements. In Porthos, we
optimize this as follows: P0 picks a random matrix 〈A〉L0 of
same size as X (Step 1) and sends 〈E〉L0 = 〈X〉L0 − 〈A〉L0 to
P1 (Step 4) that requires communicating m2 elements only.
Later, parties can reshape E locally to get E′. We reduce the
communication by P1 in a symmetric manner. Concretely, we
reduce communication from (2q2f2+2f2+q2)` in SecureNN
to (2m2+2f2+q2)`. This algorithm can be easily generalized
to the setting where there are i input filters, o output filters,
and different stride and padding parameters.
Algorithm 1: 3PC protocol for Conv2dm,f
Input: P0 holds (〈X〉L0 , 〈Y 〉L0 ) and P1 holds
(〈X〉L1 , 〈Y 〉L1 ), where X ∈ Zm×mL , Y ∈ Zf×fL .
Output: P0 gets 〈Conv2dm,f (X,Y )〉L0 and P1 gets
〈Conv2dm,f (X,Y )〉L1 .
Common Randomness: P0 & P1 hold shares of a zero
matrix U of dimension q × q, q = m− f + 1 . P0 &
P2 hold a common PRF key k0, and P1 & P2 hold a
common PRF key k1.
1) P0 & P2 use PRF key k0 to generate random matrices
〈A〉L0 ∈ Zm×mL , 〈B〉L0 ∈ Zf×fL and 〈C〉L0 ∈ Zq×qL .
2) P1 & P2 use PRF key k1 to generate random matrices
〈A〉L1 ∈ Zm×mL and 〈B〉L1 ∈ Zf×fL .
3) P2 computes A = 〈A〉L0 + 〈A〉L1 and B = 〈B〉L0 + 〈B〉L1 .
Let A′ = ReshapeInput(A) and B′ = ReshapeFilter(B).
P2 computes 〈C〉L1 = A′ ·B′ − 〈C〉L0 and sends it to P1.
4) For j ∈ {0, 1}, Pj computes 〈E〉Lj = 〈X〉Lj − 〈A〉Lj and
〈F 〉Lj = 〈Y 〉Lj − 〈B〉Lj and sends to Pj⊕1.
5) P0 & P1 reconstruct E and F using exchanged shares.
6) For j ∈ {0, 1}, Pj computes
〈X ′〉Lj = ReshapeInput(〈X〉Lj ), E′ = ReshapeInput(E),
〈Y ′〉Lj = ReshapeFilter(〈Y 〉Lj ), F ′ = ReshapeFilter(F ).
7) For j ∈ {0, 1}, Pj computes
〈Z ′〉Lj = −jE′ ·F ′+〈X ′〉Lj ·F ′+E′ ·〈Y ′〉Lj +〈C〉Lj +〈U〉Lj .
8) For j ∈ {0, 1}, Pj outputs
〈Z〉Lj = ReshapeOutput(〈Z ′〉Lj ).
Activation Functions. In SecureNN protocols for computing
activations such as ReLU and MaxPool start with parties P0
and P1 having shares of values over L = 264. For both of
these, parties run a protocol called ComputeMSB to evaluate
most significant bit (MSB) of secret values. This protocol
require shares over L − 1. So parties run a protocol called
ShareConvert to convert shares over L to shares over L − 1.
Both protocols ComputeMSB and ShareConvert require P2 to
send fresh shares of a value to P0 and P1. In SecureNN, both
of these shares were picked by P2 and explicitly communicated
to P0 and P1. As mentioned before, shares of a value x are
r and x − r, where r is a appropriately picked uniformly
random value. We observe that since one of the shares is
truly random, it can be computed as the output of a shared
PRF key between P2 and one of the parties, say P0. This
cuts the communication of this step to half. Moreover, since
many activations are computed in parallel, we can carefully
“load-balance” this optimization between P0 and P1 to reduce
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Protocol Communication (SecureNN) Communication (Porthos)
Conv2dm,i,f,o (2q
2f2i+ 2f2oi+ q2o)` (2m2i+ 2f2oi+ q2o)`
ShareConvert 4` log p+ 6` 3` log p+ 5`
ComputeMSB 4` log p+ 13` 3` log p+ 9`
ReLU 8` log p+ 24` 6` log p+ 19`
MaxPooln (8` log p+ 29`)(n− 1) (6` log p+ 24`)(n− 1)
TABLE III: Communication complexity of protocols; q = m−
f + 1 and log p = 8.
the communication to half on the critical path. We note
that this optimization reduces the overall communication of
ShareConvert, ComputeMSB, ReLU and MaxPool by 25%.
The revised table with comparison of overall communi-
cation complexity of all protocols with improvements over
SecureNN are provided in Table III. Conv2dm,i,f,o denotes
a convolutional layer with input m × m, i input channels, a
filter of size f×f , and o output channels. MaxPooln computes
the maximum value out of a list of n elements. p denotes a
prime value larger than 65 (set to 67 in SecureNN), with 8
bits being used to represent elements in Zp (hence log p = 8
in the table).
V. ARAMIS
In this section, we describe Aramis, a general technique
to convert any semi-honest secure MPC protocol into a secure
MPC protocol tolerating malicious corruptions. The threshold
of corrupted parties tolerated by the semi-honest protocol is
retained in the malicious secure protocol by our technique.
Aramis makes a very minimal trust assumption of integrity on
hardware: the code and data residing in the hardware cannot
be modified by the adversary. This implicitly requires the
hardware to possess a trusted component that can produce
signatures and this signature scheme cannot be forged by
an adversary. We do not assume confidentiality, that is, the
adversary can see all the code and user data that resides in the
hardware belonging to the corrupted parties. This significantly
weakens the trust assumption on hardware.
Overview. At a very high level, Aramis exploits the following
(well-known) observation: in order for a semi-honest protocol
to be made maliciously secure, one must ensure that all mes-
sages sent by every party Pi are computed honestly according
to the specification of the semi-honest protocol consistent with
Pi’s input and the transcript so far. The next observation we
make is that if party Pi possesses hardware whose code can
be attested by party Pj (and vice-versa), then Pj can obtain
guarantees on the correctness of protocol messages sent by
Pi as long as these messages are computed and signed by
Pi’s hardware. Using these observations, we can convert a
semi-honest secure protocol into one that is maliciously secure
by having every protocol message of Pi be computed by the
trusted hardware that Pi executes. We shall now describe
our techniques in more detail. We first describe the ideal
functionality that is assumed out of the hardware in Section
V-A. We then describe our technique in Section V-B. Finally,
we explain how Intel SGX can realize the ideal functionality
in Section V-C and challenges in porting semi-honest MPC
protocols to SGX in Section V-D.
A. The attestation ideal functionality Fattest
Description. We formally define the ideal functionality for
attested executions in Figure 7. The functionality is parameter-
ized by a signing key pair (vk, sk). Let Signsk(m) denote the
signing algorithm on message m and Verifyvk(m,σ) denote
verification of signature σ on message m. At a high level,
this functionality allows users to specify a function g to the
ideal functionality once using the Commit command. The
functionality returns a token Tg generated as Signsk(H(g)),
where H is a collision resistant hash function. Note that
this token is publicly verifiable given g and vk. Let statectr
be an internal state that the functionality maintains, indexed
by ctr – this state can be maintained by signing it along
with ctr and verifying the signature of the state on every
input message. When the functionality Fattest is initialized, the
initial state state0 is empty (or, ). Subsequent invocations
of the functionality is done on input wctr using the Compute
command. The function g is a deterministic mapping from
(ctr, wctr, rctr, statectr−1) to (yctr, statectr), where rctr is the
required randomness. The functionality picks randomness rctr,
evaluates g and provide a signature on the function output yctr
using the signing key sk. Furthermore, (yctr, statectr) is always
given to party P such that statectr contains rctr in clear and this
ensures that there is no information hidden from P and we only
assume correct execution of g. That is, the ideal functionality
can evaluate functions and provide signed outputs and these
outputs could have anyway been computed by party P given
knowledge of g, wctr, rctr, ctr, statectr, which are all known to
P . Thereby, we only assume that the functionality will sign
the output of g on the appropriate input and not hide any data
from P . This significantly weakens what is assumed from the
trusted hardware.
Functionality F (vk,sk)attest
Fattest interacts with a party P .
On input message (Commit, g) from P ,
1) Record (Commit, state0), where state0 = ;
2) Send (state0, Tg) to P , where Tg = Signsk(H(g)).
3) Ignore further (Commit, g) messages.
On input message (Compute, wctr) from P ,
retrieve statectr−1, pick required randomness rctr
and compute g(ctr, wctr, rctr, statectr−1) to obtain
(yctr, statectr) such that statectr contains (yctr, rctr). Send
(yctr, ctr, Signsk(yctr||ctr), statectr) to P .
Fig. 7: The Authentication functionality F (vk,sk)attest .
B. Semi-honest security to malicious security
Our technique takes any semi-honest secure MPC protocol
and converts it into a malicious secure MPC protocol in
the F (vk,sk)attest −hybrid model. The idea is to have messages
sent by every party Pi to every other party Pj in the semi-
honest protocol be computed by the corresponding F (vki,ski)attest
functionality interacting with Pi, where (vki, ski) are keys
used by the functionality. These messages can be verified
by functionality F (vkj ,skj)attest interacting with Pj . We assume
that every F (vki,ski)attest knows the verification key vkj used by
functionalities of all other parties Pj in a reliable manner.
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Later, we show how to achieve this through the use of remote
attestation in the context of Intel SGX. We now set notation
and describe the next message function of any semi-honest
secure MPC protocol and how we modify it for our use.
Next message function. Let pi(·) be the next message function
of any semi-honest secure MPC protocol. pi(·) takes the
following values as input - two party ids i and j, input xi, a
round number ctr, randomness ri,j,ctr and Transcripti, which
includes the transcript of all messages sent and received by
the party Pi so far. Given these, pi(·) outputs yi,jctr , which is the
message that Pi must send to Pj in round ctr and also updates
Transcripti appropriately. Additionally, pi(·) takes message yj,ictr
sent by Pj to Pi at round ctr and update Transcripti with this
message. We now describe how to modify pi(·) to pi∗(·) to
incorporate checks to detect malicious behaviour.
Modified next message function. pi∗(·), is the modified
function that builds upon pi(·) and we describe it for Pi.
1) For ctr = 1, Let xi be the input of Pi in pi(·). Then,
(ctr, xi) is stored as state1 (also called as Transcript1i )
and sent to Pi.
2) When pi∗(·) receives a message M = (yj,ictr, ctr, σ) from
party Pj , it runs Verifyvkj ((y
j,i
ctr, ctr), σ). If verification
succeeds, it appends M to Transcripti. Else, Pi aborts.
3) pi∗(·) on input (ctr, statectr−1, j) computes the next mes-
sage from Pi to Pj as follows: It checks that statectr−1
contains a valid transcript of all messages computed so
far. If it verifies, it picks randomness ri,j,ctr and runs
pi(ctr, statectr−1, j, ri,j,ctr) to compute next message y
i,j
ctr
and updated state statectr (containing ri,j,ctr). Else it
outputs ⊥. Note that statectr−1 already contains input xi,
the input of party Pi.
Malicious MPC in the Fattest−hybrid model
The malicious MPC protocol works as follows: Each
party Pi invokes F (vki,ski)attest with the command Commit using
function pi∗(·) described above and sends the received token
T (i)pi∗ to other parties Pj . It receives similar tokens T (j)pi∗ from
party Pj and verifies it under vkj . Party Pi aborts if any of
these verifications fail. If all verifications succeed, it proceeds
with running pi∗(·) inside F (vki,ski)attest as described formally in
Figure 8.
Malicious Security. Next, we prove that if pi is secure against
semi-honest adversaries, then the protocol described in Fig-
ure 8 is an MPC protocol secure against malicious adversaries
with the same corruption threshold. For simplicity, consider
the case of single malicious party Pi. Informally, we argue
that our technique constrains Pi to follow the instructions of
the semi-honest protocol pi(·) faithfully. Or, deviating from
faithful execution would result in some honest party to abort.
The first Compute invocation of F (vki,ski)attest fixes the input of
Pi used in the protocol. Since every other F (vkj ,skj)attest reliably
knows the verification key vki used by F (vki,ski)attest , it checks
the signatures on the function description (i.e., T (i)pi∗ ) as well
as the messages of the protocol. The unforgeability of the
signature scheme guarantees that Pi cannot forge signatures on
incorrectly generated protocol messages. Note that we use this
property to ensure that both of the following signatures cannot
be forged: (a) signatures under vki on messages generated by
Protocol Protmalicious(P1, · · · , Pn)
Party Pi with input xi interacts with {Pj}j 6=i and F (vki,ski)attest
and does the following:
Invokes F (vki,ski)attest on (Commit, pi∗) to receive
(state
(i)
0 , T (i)pi∗ ) and sends T (i)pi∗ to all parties Pj ,
j 6= i.
Receives T (j)pi∗ from Pj and runs Verifyvkj (H(pi∗), T
(j)
pi∗ )
for all j ∈ [n] \ i. Aborts if one of these checks fail.
Invokes F (vki,ski)attest on (Compute, xi) to get Transcript1i
containing input xi.
When Pi receives a message M = (yj,ictr , ctr, σ) from party
Pj , it invokes F (vki,ski)attest on (Compute, (yj,ictr , ctr, σ)) and
receives updated transcript or ⊥ (and aborts).
When Pi needs to send next message to Pj it invokes
F (vki,ski)attest on (Compute, j) and receives (yi,jctr , ctr, σ)
along with updated transcript and randomness used.
Here, σ is a signature on (yi,jctr , ctr) under ski. It sends
(yi,jctr , ctr, σ) to Pj .
When Pi has no more messages to send in pi(·), it
computes the output of the function from Transcripti.
Fig. 8: Malicious secure MPC Protmalicious(P1, · · · , Pn).
Functionality Ffmpc(P1, · · · , Pn)
Ffmpc interacts with parties {P1, · · · , Pn} and the adversary S.
On input message xi from Pi record xi and ignore further
xi from Pi
Upon receiving xi from all Pi, i ∈ [n], compute y =
f(x1, · · · , xn) and send to S.
Upon receiving (i,Send) or (i,⊥) from S, send y or ⊥
to Pi.
Fig. 9: The MPC functionality Ffmpc.
F (vki,ski)attest and sent to honest Pj (b) signatures under vkj on
messages sent by Pj being fed into F (vki,ski)attest . Also, F (vki,ski)attest
provides correct randomness to generate messages of Pi in the
semi-honest secure protocol. Hence, all messages from Pi to
any honest party Pj are generated correctly as directed by pi.
This argument can be easily extended to multiple colluding
corrupt parties.
Formally, we give a security proof using the standard
simulation paradigm (we refer the reader to [26], [16] for
details on the paradigm). That is, the protocol in Figure 8
securely realizes the ideal MPC functionality described in
Figure 9 against malicious adversaries.
Theorem 1: Let pi(·) be a semi-honest secure
MPC protocol securely realizing Ffmpc. Then, protocol
Protmalicious(P1, · · · , Pn) described in Figure 8 securely
realizes Ffmpc in the F (vki,ski)attest −hybrid model (with i ∈ [n])
against malicious adversaries.
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Proof Sketch: Let A be the real world adversary. Ideal
world adversary S that simulates the view of A is as follows:
Let S ′ be the ideal world adversary or the semi-honest sim-
ulator for pi (this exists because pi is semi-honest secure). S
picks {(vkk, skk)}k∈[n] and gives {vkk}k∈[n] to A. We denote
a corrupt party by Pi and honest party by Pj . Next, when
A invokes an instance of F (vki,ski)attest on command Commit
for a corrupted party Pi, S simulates the correct behavior of
F (vki,ski)attest . Also, S sends correctly generated tokens {T (j)pi∗ }
for all honest parties to A. When S receives token from A
corresponding to a corrupted party Pi, it checks it against
pi∗ and vki. It aborts if verification fails. When A invokes
F (vki,ski)attest with xi, S stores it as input of Pi. When A commits
to inputs of all corrupt parties, S sends these to Ffmpc to learn
output y. It sends inputs of corrupt parties and output y to
S ′ that generates the view of the adversary in the semi-honest
protocol, that contains the randomness for all corrupt parties as
well as the transcript of the protocol. Using this, it is easy for
S to simulate the view of A in the rest of the protocol. The
indistinguishability of the adversary’s view in real and ideal
executions follows from the semi-honest security of pi.
C. Realizing Fattest using Intel SGX
SGX allows a host to create a protected region known as
an enclave. Intel gives integrity guarantees, that is, the code
and the data residing in the enclave, once attested, cannot be
modified by the host or the operating system. When SGX
receives a Commit command (Figure 7) for a function g, then
it creates an enclave with code g. Randomness rctr of Figure 7
can be sampled in SGX using sgx_read_rand command.
The attestation token Tg is generated by SGX communicating
with Intel’s Attestation Service (IAS) and this token is publicly
verifiable given g and public verification key corresponding to
Intel’s Report Signing Key. The key-pair (vk, sk) for ECDSA
signature scheme is also generated inside the enclave and
the verification key vk is sent as payload to IAS during the
generation of the attestation token. The token Tg contains the
verification key vk in the clear and this vk can be used to
verify the signed outputs yctr. Now, on receiving the Compute
command, the enclave starts executing the code of g and
produces outputs signed under sk.
While running MPC in the Fattest-hybrid, we require the
enclave to reliably have verification keys used by enclaves of
all other parties. This can be done by attaching the following
prelude to pi∗ (the code running inside SGX): Read the tokens
of all parties, parse them to obtain the verification keys, and
verify the signature on the tokens using verification key of
Intel’s Report Signing key. Note that since all the parties are
running the same function pi∗ (appended with this prelude),
they can compute the hash of pi∗ locally and compare it with
the hash in the tokens (which has been signed by Intel’s IAS) of
all the other parties, proceeding only if they all match perfectly.
D. Implementation challenges with SGX
We outline some of the key challenges in implementing
MPC between multiple SGX enclaves that involve multiple
rounds of interaction and operate over large volumes of data.
1) Memory constraints in SGX: In SGX, all the enclave
content, including code, and related data is stored in a special
region of memory known as the Enclave Page Cache (EPC).
The size of EPC is fixed in BIOS and can have a maximum
size of 128MB. Typically, paging facilitates the execution of
enclaves which cannot fit in EPC and any page that is evicted
out is encrypted before storing it on unprotected memory [36].
This additional overhead has detrimental effects on the overall
performance of the enclave application. We reduce the working
set of secure inference tasks to limit these overheads.
• ReLU and MaxPool functions: We split the computation
of memory intensive non-linear functions into chunks that
fit in EPC to avoid paging. For example, a secure ReLU
computation that requires 120MB memory is split into
3 chunks of 40MB each. Note that chunking increases
the number of MPC rounds and very small chunks are
actually detrimental to performance.
• Convolution and Matrix Multiplication functions: For the
linear functions, we block the matrices into smaller ones,
process the blocks, and aggregate them. We ensure that
individual blocks fit in EPC.
• Liveness Analysis: Athos implements liveness analysis
(Section III-D) which reduces the memory footprint of
the compiled DNNs.
2) Porting Interactive Protocols to SGX: To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first work to implement highly
interactive protocols in SGX and this comes with unique
challenges. For example, whenever any data is passed across
the enclave’s protected memory region, it has to be mar-
shalled in/out of the region3. The performance of marshalling
mainly depends on the size of the parameters crossing the
bridge. Larger parameters imply slower marshalling [36], while
smaller parameters increase the total numbers of cross-bridge
calls (which have an overhead of their own). Thus, we tune
the payload size carefully. We also implement the techniques
in [59] for optimizing communication involving enclaves.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
Overview. In this section, we present our experimental
results. First, in Section VI-A, we use CRYPTFLOW
to securely compute inference on the ImageNet dataset
using the following TensorFlow programs – RESNET504,
DENSENET1215, and SQUEEZENET6. We stress that no prior
work has run MPC on networks of this scale. We also show
that the performance of semi-honest and malicious protocols
generated by CRYPTFLOW scale linearly with the depth of
DNNs. Second, in Section VI-B, we show that CRYPTFLOW
outperforms prior works on secure inference of DNNs. These
experiments are on smaller DNNs that perform prediction
over the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets as prior work could
only handle such small benchmarks. Next, we evaluate each
3When pointers to memory are passed as parameters into the enclave via
an ecall, the referenced data block is marshalled into the enclave, specifically
into the protected memory region that an enclave uses. Similarly, when a
pointer to enclave data, residing in protected memory region, is passed outside
an enclave via an ocall, the referenced data block is marshalled out of the
protected memory region.
4https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/official/r1/resnet
5https://github.com/pudae/tensorflow-densenet
6https://github.com/avoroshilov/tf-squeezenet
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component of CRYPTFLOW in more detail. In Section VI-C,
we show that the fixed-point code generated by Athos matches
the accuracy of floating-point RESNET50, DENSENET121,
and SQUEEZENET. We show in Section VI-D how the
optimizations in Porthos help it outperform prior works in
terms of communication complexity and overall execution
time. In Section VI-E, we show the overhead of obtaining
malicious secure MPC (over semi-honest security) using
Aramis for GMW [26] and Porthos. We show Aramis-based
malicious secure inference outperforms pure crypto-based
malicious secure protocols by huge margins in Section VI-E1.
Finally, in section VI-F, we discuss two case-studies of
running CRYPTFLOW on DNNs for healthcare. We begin by
providing details of the systems used to run our experiments.
System Details. All our large benchmark experiments
are in a LAN setting on 3.7GHz machines, each with 4 cores
and with 16 GB of RAM running Linux Ubuntu 16.04. The
measured bandwidth between each of the machines was at
most 377 MBps and the latency was sub millisecond. Since
we wanted to use the same machines to benchmark both our
semi-honest as well as our malicious secure protocols, we
were constrained to use machines that had Intel SGX enabled
on them - this led to machines that had considerably lower
bandwidth between them (377 MBps) than those normally
used by prior works in the area (e.g. [44], [10] used networks
with bandwidth of 1.5 GBps). For Aramis, we used Intel SGX
SDK version 2.4. We observed that the compilation time of
CRYPTFLOW remains under 40 seconds for our benchmarks.
A. Secure Inference on ImageNet
In this section, we show the power of CRYPT-
FLOW, by demonstrating secure inference of RESNET50,
DENSENET121, and SQUEEZENET over the ImageNet dataset
with over 1000 classes. We briefly describe these DNNs and
then present performance results.
1) RESNET50 [30] is a network that follows the residual
neural network architecture. The residual nodes employs
“skip connections” or short cuts between layers. It con-
sists of 53 convolution layers with filters of size upto
7×7, and 1 fully connected layer of size 2048×1001. The
activation function between most layers is batch normal-
ization followed by ReLU. After the first convolutional
layer, the activation function also includes a MaxPool.
2) DENSENET121 [33] is a form of residual neural network
that employs several parallel skips. It consists of 121
convolutional layers with filters of size upto 7 × 7. The
activation function between these layers is usualy batch
normalization followed by ReLU. Some layers also use
MaxPool or AvgPool.
3) SQUEEZENET [35] is a notoriously hard to train network
and no prior work has considered evaluating this architec-
ture on ImageNet with fixed-point arithmetic. It consists
of 26 convolutional layers with filters of size upto 3× 3.
The activation function between these layers is usually
ReLU and MaxPool.
Performance. As shown in Table IV, CRYPTFLOW securely
computes the inference over all these state-of-the-art networks
within a range of 11–36 seconds with semi-honest security
and 29–112 seconds with malicious security. We measure
Benchmark Semi-Honest (s) Malicious (s) Communication (GB)
RESNET50 25.9 75.4 6.9
DENSENET121 36.0 112.9 10.5
SQUEEZENET 11.3 29.0 2.6
TABLE IV: CRYPTFLOW: ImageNet scale benchmarks.
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Fig. 10: Scalability of CRYPTFLOW on RESNET-n.
communication as total communication between all 3 parties
- each party roughly communicates a third of this value. The
communication in semi-honest secure and malicious secure in-
ference is almost the same. Thus demonstrating that ImageNet
scale inference can be performed in about 30 seconds with
semi-honest security and in under two minutes with malicious
security. The malicious security provided by CRYPTFLOW is
about 3X more expensive than semi-honest security.
Scalability. We show that the running time of CRYPTFLOW-
based protocols increases linearly with the depth of DNNs.
We compile RESNET-n (where n, the approximate number of
convolutional layers, varies from 18 to 200) with CRYPTFLOW
and evaluate with both semi-honest (Porthos) and malicious
secure protocols (Aramis) in Figure 10. Our largest benchmark
here is RESNET-200, the deepest version of RESNET on
the ImageNet dataset [31], which has 65 million parameters.
Other RESNET-n benchmarks have between 11 to 60 million
parameters 7. We observe that the communication and runtime
increase linearly with depth. Even with increasing depth, the
overhead of malicious security (over semi-honest security)
remains constant at about 3X.
B. Comparison with prior work
In this section, we show that CRYPTFLOW outperforms
prior works on secure inference of DNNs on the benchmarks
they consider, i.e., tiny 2–4 layer DNNs over the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. We stress that these benchmarks are very
small compared to the ImageNet scale DNNs discussed above.
In order to provide a fair comparison, for these experiments,
we use a network with similar bandwidth as prior works (1.5
GBps) and machines with similar compute (2.7 GHz).
Table V compares Porthos with prior (ABY3 [44] and
SecureNN [61]) and concurrent (QuantizedNN [10]) semi-
honest secure 3PC works on the MNIST dataset. Table VI
7Specifically, 11, 22, 25, 44 and 60 million parameters for RESNET-n for
n = 18, 34, 50, 101, and 152 respectively.
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Benchmark ABY3 Quantized NN SecureNN Porthos
Logistic Regression 4 − − 2.7
SecureML (3 layer DNN) 8 20 17 8
MiniONN (4 layer CNN) - 80 47 34
LeNet (4 layer CNN) - 120 79 58
TABLE V: Comparison with 3PC on MNIST dataset – All
times in milliseconds.
Benchmark CHET MiniONN EzPC Gazelle Porthos
SQUEEZENET∗ (CIFAR) 1342 - - - 0.05
MiniONN (CIFAR) - 544 265.6 12.9 0.36
MiniONN (MNIST) - 9.4 5.1 0.81 0.03
TABLE VI: Comparison with 2PC – All times in seconds.
CHET replaces ReLUs in a small SQUEEZENET with square
activations.
compares Porthos with prior 2PC work. We omit some prior
works (e.g., [45], [15], [55], etc.) in these tables as they are
slower than Gazelle and do not provide additional insights. As
can be seen from the tables, the 2PC systems are much slower
than the 3PC systems and Porthos performs better than other
3PC systems. For instance, for a 4-layer CNN for MNIST from
MiniONN [42], the best 2PC-backend Gazelle takes 810 ms,
prior best 3PC work takes 47 ms, and Porthos takes 34 ms.
C. Athos experiments
Accuracy of Float-to-Fixed. We show that Athos generated
fixed-point code matches the accuracy of floating-code on
RESNET50, DENSENET121, and SQUEEZENET in Table VII.
The table also shows the precision or the scale that is selected
by Athos (Section III-B). We observe that different benchmarks
require different precision to maximize the classification ac-
curacy and that the technique of “sweeping” through various
precision levels is effective. We show how accuracy varies
with precision in Appendix B. Evaluating accuracy also helps
validate the correctness of our compilation [46].
Modularity. Since CRYPTFLOW is modular, we can compile
it to various MPC backends. To demonstrate this ability, we
also add a 2PC semi-honest secure protocol ABY [22] to
CRYPTFLOW. The performance with this backend is in Table
VIII. We ran logistic regression (LR) as well as a small
LeNet network [40] which comprises of 2 convolutional layers
(with maximum filter size of 5 × 5) and 2 fully connected
layers, with ReLU and MaxPool as the activation functions.
This evaluation shows that CRYPTFLOW can be easily used
for a variety of backends - however the current state-of-
the-art performance of 2PC makes it difficult to execute the
large DNNs described in Section VI-A. One could potentially
implement the functions in Table II with state-of-the-art 2PC
backends such as Gazelle [38]. The codebase of Gazelle is not
publicly available and hence we could not do the same.
Benchmark Float Fixed Float Fixed Scale
Top 1 Top 1 Top 5 Top 5
RESNET50 76.47 76.45 93.21 93.23 12
DENSENET121 74.25 74.33 91.88 91.90 11
SQUEEZENET 55.86 55.92 79.18 79.24 10
TABLE VII: Accuracy of fixed-point vs floating-point.
Benchmark CRYPTFLOW (s) Communication (MB)
LogisticRegression 0.227 25.5
LeNet Small 47.4 2939
TABLE VIII: CRYPTFLOW compilation to 2PC on MNIST.
Benchmark SecureNN (s) Porthos (s) SecureNN Porthos
Comm. (GB) Comm. (GB)
RESNET50 38.36 25.87 8.54 6.87
DENSENET121 53.99 36.00 13.53 10.54
SQUEEZENET 16.55 11.28 3.88 2.63
TABLE IX: Porthos vs SecureNN.
D. Porthos experiments
Since Porthos improves SecureNN, we compare them in
mode detail. As described earlier, Porthos improves over
the communication complexity of SecureNN [61] both for
convolutional layers as well as for non-linear activation func-
tions. We have already compared SecureNN and Porthos on
benchmarks considered in SecureNN in Table V. Additionaly,
we also compare Porthos and SecureNN on ImageNet scale
benchmarks in Table IX. For this purpose, we add the code
of SecureNN available at [60] as another backend to CRYPT-
FLOW. These results show that Porthos improves upon the
communication of SecureNN by a factor of roughly 1.2X–
1.5X and the runtime by a factor of roughly 1.4X–1.5X.
E. Aramis experiments
We ported both the 2-party GMW protocol [26] (using
the codebase [34], based on [19]) as well as Porthos into
Intel SGX. The results for different functions using the GMW
protocol are presented in Table X. IPn denotes the inner
product of two n-element vectors over F2, Add32 and Mult32
denote addition and multiplication over 32 bits respectively,
and Millionaire32 denotes the millionaires problem that com-
pares two 32−bit integers x and y and outputs a single bit
denoting whether x > y. Aramis in this table denotes the
semi-honest GMW protocol ported into Intel SGX to provide
malicious security.
As can be seen, all overheads in this case, are within
54% of the semi-honest protocol. Since these benchmarks are
small, all of the code and data fit inside the SGX enclave
without any requirement for paging and hence overheads are
also minimal. For ImageNet scale benchmarks, the overheads
are higher (Table IV). Since these benchmarks are much larger,
we have to deal with well-known paging issues that occur when
using Intel SGX with large data [36]; here we incur overheads
of about 3X over semi-honest protocols.
1) Comparison with crypto-only malicious MPC: We
demonstrate that Aramis based malicious secure protocols
are better suited for large scale inference tasks compared to
pure cryptographic solutions. We compare the performance of
Porthos compiled with Aramis and the concurrent work of
QuantizedNN [10] that uses the MP-SPDZ [39] framework
to also provide a malicious secure variant of their protocol.
Both these approaches provide security for the same setting
of 3PC with 1 corruption. On the four MNIST inference
benchmarks A/B/C/D in the MP-SPDZ repository, Aramis is
10X/46X/44X/15X faster. Furthermore, in these performance
measurements, we are being unfair to Aramis: MP-SPDZ strips
out all the ReLUs from its performance estimates and its
performance would be much worse in their presence. However,
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Benchmark GMW (ms) Aramis (ms) Overhead
IP10,000 464 638 1.37x
IP100,000 2145 3318 1.54x
Add32 279 351 1.25x
Mult32 354 461 1.30x
Millionaire32 292 374 1.28x
TABLE X: Semi-honest GMW vs Malicious Aramis.
the Aramis time measurements include the time to compute
ReLUs, which can be 80% of the total execution time. If one
were to evaluate ReLUs with MP-SPDZ then the speedups of
Aramis would be even higher.
F. Real world impact
We discuss our experience with using CRYPTFLOW to
compile and run DNNs used in healthcare. These DNNs are
available as pretrained Keras models. We converted them
into TensorFlow using [4] and compiled the automatically
generated TensorFlow code with CRYPTFLOW.
a) Chest X-Ray: In [63], the authors train a
DENSENET121 to predict lung diseases from chest X-ray
images. They use the publicly available NIH dataset of chest
X-ray images and end up achieving an average AUROC score
of 0.845 across 14 possible disease labels. During secure
inference, we observed no loss in accuracy and the runtime
is similar to the runtime of DENSENET121for ImageNet.
b) Diabetic Retinopathy CNN: Diabetic Retinopathy
(DR), one of the major causes of blindness, is a medical
condition which leads to damage of retina due to diabetes [47].
In recent times, major tech companies have taken an interest
in using DNNs for diagnosing DR from retinal images [47],
[28]. Predicting whether a retina image has DR or not can be
done securely in about 30 seconds with CRYPTFLOW.
VII. RELATED WORK
High level languages. CRYPTFLOW is the first system to
compile high level TensorFlow code to secure MPC protocols.
There have been prior works that compile from lower-
level, domain-specific languages to MPC. Examples include
Fairplay [43], Wysteria [53], ObliVM [41], CBMC-GC [32],
SMCL [49], Sharemind [13], EzPC [17], SPDZ [7], and
HyCC [15]. Reimplementing DNNs in the input format of
these tools is a formidable task. In particular, the float-to-fixed
compilation must be done manually by a user of these
frameworks. Thus, prior systems fall short of providing the
type of support required to run realistic ML benchmarks.
Fixed-point in MPC. Although the use of fixed-point
for secure computations is well-known [51], prior works on
secure inference have addressed the float-to-fixed problem
by either generating a fixed-point model by hand ([45], [42],
[38], [44], [61]), or by using non-standard training algorithms
that output fixed-point models ([54], [5]). Both of these
approaches are unsatisfactory. In particular, some of the
challenges that one would face with the latter include: a) the
need to train again on the whole training data which is both
computationally expensive, and impossible if the training data
is unavailable; and b) training algorithms that generate integer
models is still an active research area and an overwhelming
majority of ML training algorithms still generate floating-point
models. Athos alleviates all these problems by working with a
trained model and being completely oblivious to the training
procedure. The ML users can train their networks in the
manner they see fit and then use Athos to get fixed-point code.
Float-to-fixed. The research literature in float-to-fixed
for digital signal processors is rich and spans several decades.
However, it is only recently that these schemes have been
adapted to machine learning. Some recent float-to-fixed
schemes [27], [48] show promise by quantizing floating-point
models to 8-bit or 16-bit integers. One could potentially use
one of these systems in place of our float-to-fixed component
– however, their compatibility with MPC protocols is unclear.
Additionally, since we use higher bit-width of 64, not
surprisingly, the accuracy of CRYPTFLOW is better. Another
approach is to use TensorFlow’s “post-training-quantization”
support that converts a floating-point model to a model
over 8-bit and 32-bit integers. However, at inference time,
to preserve accuracy, all operations are still performed
in floating-point arithmetic, which are very slow in MPC
(Table I). Similarly, the quantized SQUEEZENET [35] models
are stored as integers but are converted to floating-point at
inference time.
Secure Machine Learning. There has been a flurry of recent
results in the area of secure machine learning, both in the
2-party [14], [50], [25], [42], [38], as well as in the 3-party
setting [55], [44], [61], [10]. The most revelant to our work
are ABY3 [44] and SecureNN [61] that both provide 3-party
semi-honest secure computation protocols for a variety
of neural network inference and training algorithms, with
somewhat similar performance guarantees. As we show later,
Porthos, our 3-party semi-honest protocol, outperforms both
these works. We also remark that there have been other recent
works [54], [57], [5], [24], [20], [12], that modify the inference
or training algorithms in order to obtain performance benefits.
These are applicable only to specialized benchmarks. For
example, the works that use fully homomorphic encryption
(e.g., [20], [12]) do not support ReLUs. On the other hand,
we focus on standard inference algorithms and CRYPTFLOW
has much wider applicability.
Hardware-based security. Our work is the first to provide
experimentally validated malicious secure inference of ML
algorithms at the scale of RESNET50. As discussed earlier,
we achieve this by relying on minimally secure hardware to
provide code attestation and integrity. Prior works that use
hardware enclaves for secure computation [56], [52], [29], [9],
[18] assume that the enclave hides all data residing in it from
the host. The only prior work that assumes a weaker trust
assumption from the hardware is that of Trame`r et al. [59].
Similar to our work, they assume that the hardware provides
code attestation and integrity. However, their work is in the
context of zero-knowledge proofs and other fundamentally
asymmetric primitives that require only one enclave and not
interactive protocols between multiple enclaves.
VIII. CONCLUSION
CRYPTFLOW is the first end-to-end system from a high
level framework, TensorFlow, to MPC protocols. It comes with
3 important components - a) Athos, the float-to-fixed compiler
which matches the accuracy of floating-point DNNs, b) an
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improved semi-honest 3-party secure computation protocol for
DNNs, and c) a generic technique to convert semi-honest se-
cure protocols to maliciously secure ones that makes a minimal
trust assumption in hardware. We demonstrate the first instance
of secure inference on large benchmarks such as RESNET50
and DENSENET121 on the ImageNet dataset with both semi-
honest (in about thirty seconds) and malicious security (in less
than two minutes). CRYPTFLOW easily supports a variety of
backend crypto protocols and we believe that it can serve as
the benchmark framework for future works in the area. In
the future, we would like to consider compiling TensorFlow
training code as well. However, none of the existing MPC
protocols [45], [61], [44] for training have GPU support and
thus the overheads of secure training are huge.
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APPENDIX
A. Algorithms used by Porthos
The additional algorithms that reshape filters, input, and
output, used by Porthos are described in Algorithms 2, 3, and
4.
Algorithm 2: ReshapeFilter
Input: X ∈ Zf×fL .
Output: Z ∈ Zf2×1L .
1. for i = {0, ..., f − 1} do
2. for j = {0, ..., f − 1} do
3. Z[i · f + j] = X[i][j]
4. end for
5. end for
Algorithm 3: ReshapeInput
Input: X ∈ Zm×mL .
Output: Z ∈ Zn2×f2L where n = m− f + 1.
Global Information: Filter dimension f .
1. for i = {0, ...,m− f} do
2. for j = {0, ...,m− f} do
3. for k = {0, ..., f − 1} do
4. for l = {0, ..., f − 1} do
5.
Z[i · (m− f + 1) + j][k · f + j] = X[k + i][l + j]
6. end for
7. end for
8. end for
9. end for
Algorithm 4: ReshapeOutput
Input: X ∈ Zn2×1L .
Output: Z ∈ Zn×nL .
1. for i = {0, ..., n− 1} do
2. for j = {0, ..., n− 1} do
3. Z[i][j] = X[i · n+ j]
4. end for
5. end for
B. Accuracy of Athos
In this section, we present the Top 1 and Top 5 accuracies
of Athos on ImageNet dataset.
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Fig. 11: RESNET50: Top 1 accuracy vs Scale
93.08
93.1
93.12
93.14
93.16
93.18
93.2
93.22
93.24
9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
To
p5
 A
cc
ur
ac
y
Scaling Factor
Top5 Accuracy Vs Scaling Factor
Fixed Point Accuracy Floating Point Accuracy
Fig. 12: RESNET50: Top 5 accuracy vs Scale
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Fig. 14: SQUEEZENET: Top 5 accuracy vs Scale
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Fig. 15: DENSENET121: Top 1 accuracy vs Scale
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